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Abstract: 
 
This paper analyzes China's development strategy by focusing on both global and 
regional approaches to solving problems of energy security and ecological imbalance by 
addressing specifically the problems of China’s energy security. PRC’s growing energy 
dependence has become a major concern for both economic and national security 
policymakers in that country. The ambitious goal of modernization of the economy along 
the lines of the other newly industrialized economies(NIEs) of Asia has succeeded only 
too well, and it is difficult to reorient economic priorities. If examined rigorously, such an 
economic strategic assumption can be seen to entail the goal of creating further 
technological capabilities. In particular, China seems to be firmly committed to the 
creation of a largely self-sustaining innovation system as part of a knowledge-based 
economy of the future . Such innovation systems, called positive feedback loop 
innovation systems or POLIS have been created by advanced countries, and NIEs such as 
South Korea and Taiwan are proceeding to create these as well. But this will add to its 
energy burden and further dependence on the US as the power which controls the key sea 
lanes. Only a strategic reorientation to building a self-sustaining POLIS and appropriate 
regional cooperation institutions can lead to the way out of the current dilemma for 
China. Fortunately, such a model of POLIS which is distributionally and ecologically 
sensitive can be built for China and applied strategically to lead towards a sustainable 
development trajectory. 
 
 However, time is of the essence. Given the path dependence of development unless 
strategic disengagement from the existing path followed by a strategic engagement with 
the alternative strategy is begun within the next five years, it may well be too late. The 
stakes are indeed very high. A  more detailed strategy paper based on the key ideas from 
the alternative strategy outlined here with concrete quantitative scenarios and feasibility 
studies along the lines of models sketched in the appendix ( and other, more detailed 
models) will go some distance towards  giving the appropriate analytical foundations for 
the policy makers. The preliminary results confirm the predictions regarding fossil fuel-
based energy shortage and lead towards a serious consideration of alternative energy 
sources. Achieving the twin goals of energy security and ecological balance are 
challenging but not impossible for China. Serious policy research can be used effectively 
if there is the political will to do so. The goal of regional cooperation is also achievable if 
patient negotiations in good faith can start in earnest. In particular, cooperation with other  
Asian economies, particularly Japan, Indonesia, Viet Nam and India will be crucial.This 
paper has sketched out the complexities of cooperation and conflict between China and 
Japan. Future work will address the problems of Regional cooperation for China in the 
East, South and South Asian context as well as in the context of Africa and Latin 
America. 
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1. Introduction: 
 
 
 
This paper analyzes China's development strategy by focusing on both global and 
regional approaches to solving problems of energy security and ecological imbalance by 
addressing specifically the problems of China’s energy security. PRC’s growing energy 
dependence has become a major concern for both economic and national security 
policymakers in that country. The ambitious goal of modernization of the economy along 
the lines of the other newly industrialized economies(NIEs) of Asia has succeeded only 
too well, and it is difficult to reorient economic priorities. China’s  remarkable growth 
during the last twenty five years has led to a rapid increasae in energy demand, and its 
hunger for energy is apparently insatiable. There are of course both economic  and 
ecological aspects of this insatiable  demand for energy. There are also security issues 
that exercise the Chinese leadership increasingly. In this paper I examine the measures 
that China is taking to achieve energy security and the motivations behind these 
measures. I also look at China's investment in overseas oil exploration and development 
projects, interest in transnational oil pipelines, plans for a strategic petroleum reserve, 
expansion of refineries to process crude supplies from the Middle East, development of 
the natural gas industry, and gradual opening of onshore drilling areas to foreign oil 
companies. The key question is: can China hope to achieve both equitable growth and 
energy security  over the next two decades? I suggest the kind of  mathematical modeling 
and political economy analysis that may be necessary to answer this two-pronged 
question rigorously. 
 
China faces at least two pressing sets of energy policy challenges. The first is a problem 
of short run efficiency and  therefore relates to the immediate need to improve 
management and coordination of the nation’s energy supply. During the last five years 
economic growth has been more than 8% per annum. At the same time, energy demand 
grew by about 15% annually while oil imports grew at 30% per year. In today’s China, 
electrical power shortages are widespread, and transport bottlenecks constrain the ability 
of the industry to move both coal and oil to where they are needed.  
There are also longer term  energy policy challenges.   These concern the continuing 
inability of China’s government to formulate a coherent energy policy which could 
provide the basis for the effective management of the energy sector and its environmental 
consequences for the next fifty years and beyond.  
 
 
 
China’s entry into the WTO has already had and in the future will have diverse 
consequences for its economy and energy. The best overall assessment from the Chinese 
perspective is that although the short run adjustment costs--- for example, the increase in 
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unemployment in the agricultural sector--- may be high, the long run economic benefits 
from integration into the world trading system are likely to be considerable. In particular, 
it is assumed that the export-led growth will continue and will also lead to the 
modernization of the economy along the lines of the other newly industrialized 
economies(NIEs) of Asia. If examined rigorously, such an assumption can be seen to 
entail the goal of creating further technological capabilities. In particular, China seems to 
be firmly committed to the creation of a largely self-sustaining innovation system as part 
of a knowledge-based economy of the future (Simon,1996; Simon and Goldman,1989; 
Lu, 2000). Such innovation systems, called positive feedback loop innovation systems or 
POLIS(Khan, 1998; 2003; 2004a) have been created by advanced countries, and NIEs 
such as South Korea and Taiwan are proceeding to create these as well.1 Can China do 
the same? And will China’s entry into the WTO help or hinder such efforts? While the 
answers here are not clear, it is reasonable to say that its WTO membership2 will open the 
way towards diversification of energy import sources. However, I will argue that much 
depends on US-China bilateral relationship also. Furthermore, as I will show, the current 
strategy of indiscriminate growth only without regards to sustainability or equity will 
make China’s growth deeply problematic even in an open economy context of rules-
based trading in the WTO framework.  
 
 
In what follows, I will begin by identifying the most important aspects of the energy 
demand and supply in PRC in order to ascertain China’s energy dependence. This will 
enable us to look at both economic welfare and sustainability issues as well as security 
issues which are discussed in section 3. Section 4 discusses the China-Japan relations in 
the field of energy against a broader background of cooperation and conflict. This section 
also illustrates some of  the problems that China and other potential partners for regional 
cooperation will need to face and solve. In conclusion, I draw attention to the real 
dilemma faced by the ambitious Chinese leaders and suggest that multilateralism and 
regional cooperation are the best strategic responses available to China. 
 
 
2. China’s energy dilemma: demand, supply and distributional issues 
 
 
China is now the world’s second largest consumer of energy, accounting for some 12% 
of global energy demand, but its rate of increase of demand is some four to five times that 
                                                 
1
 A formal and complete description of POLIS as an innovation system ,and contrasts with NIS(national 
innovation system) of which POLIS is both an extension and an extended critique, is outside the scope of 
this paper. Khan (2004a) gives a formal description and two existence theorems in topological spaces. 
Technically, non-linearities and multiple equilibria are at the heart of a formal proof of POLIS and its 
properties. Khan (2003) presents both  a conceptual and concrete critique of NIS by comparing and 
contrasting the national innovation system ( NIS) with POLIS in the context of Taiwan. 
2
 For welfare aspects of China’s entry into WTO see Khan, Haider A., "China's Entry into the WTO: ICT 
Sectors, Innovation, Growth and Distribution", July (2002b) - (Website address: 
http://www.e.utokyo.ac.jp/cirje/index.htm)  
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for the rest of the world. So what happens in China’s energy sector will affect the rest of 
the world as well. Table 1 below gives a picture of China’s actual and projected energy 
consumption till the year 2015.  
China’s energy sector displays continuing dependence on coal. China is the world’s 
largest consumer of coal, accounting for more than 30% of global coal consumption. 
Further, coal provides approximately 64% of China’s primary energy demand. While 
such dependence on coal is not necessarily a huge problem, it has two  unfortunate 
consequences. The first problem is that the use of coal is characterized by low energy 
efficiency. The second problem is that extensive coal usage without clean technologies 
creates  pollution at a large scale.  
The  intrinsic energy value of a unit weight of coal is known to be less than that for oil 
and gas. The recovery rates for many of China’s coal mines are also low, meaning that 
much of the country’s coal resource is left in the ground, never to be recovered. Table 1 
below  confirms this. Furthermore, the efficiency of appliances which use coal in China 
continues to be substantially lower than the average in OECD countries. Progress has 
been slow in enhancing the efficiency of consumer electrical appliances and 
implementing building codes which reduce heat losses. Finally, the continuing low level 
of end-user prices has failed to provide consumers with incentives to save energy.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
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From table 1 above it is clear that China’s energy consumption will be 4 times what it 
was in 1980 by the year 2015.The share of oil during the same period will be on the 
increase also.China shifted from being  net oil exporter to net oil importer in 1993.What 
explains the increasing dependence on oil? Table 2 below is an input-output 
decomposition of China’s energy use. Scrutinizing  table 2 below we can see that it is 
intimately related to final demand shift. Within the final demand shift, both household 
and investment needs are responsible for the lion’s share. Thus, China’s industrialization 
strategy and the increasing prosperity of households can explain its increasing 
dependence on energy imports. This is not likely to change in the near future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
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Table 3 
 
 
Although domestic production figures have not been projected till 2015 in table 3 above, 
simple extrapolation would show that import dependence is here to stay. Thus the 
conclusion that follows from the evidence presented in tables 1 and 2 seems to be that 
China’s  import dependence will be a policy problem for at least till 2025, if not for even 
a longer period. The vulnerability from potential disruption of supplies can be extensive. . 
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Scenarios run by the EIA and the RAND corporation in the US show the effects on GDP 
when supply is disrupted because of unforeseen geopolitical events or natural disasters. 
These effects are in the three to four per cent range when prices shift unfavorably 
affecting supply and production and can be larger when the shocks are unpredictable and 
much substitution out of imported fossil fuels may not be feasible. In the appendix, I 
outline a model that looks at the distributional impacts of such disruptions in a linear 
approximation scenario. In particular, poverty impacts are derived. The preliminary 
results suggest strongly that almost all of China’s growth induced poverty reduction gains 
can be destroyed through disruptions in the energy markets alone. In addition, the 
ecological consequences of the current fossil-fuel dependent development strategy are 
already proving  to be serious. The following global pollution map for the year 1999 
makes this point clear. The most developed parts of China are also among the most 
polluted areas in the world. 
 
Figure 1: Global Pollution and the Chinese Situation 1999 
 
 
 
   A global map of nitrogen dioxide in the atmosphere from Germany has revealed the 
most precise view yet of pollution hotspots around the world. The instrument used was 
the Scanning Imaging Absorption Spectrometer for Atmospheric Chartography 
(SCIAMACHY), developed by John Burrows at the University of Bremen, Germany.  
 
 
The following map, based on 18 months’ worth of satellite data, shows very high levels 
of NO2 above major European and North American cities and across much of North-East 
China.3 The Chinese cities are revealed to be the largest cluster with the most population. 
                                                 
3
 Data for the map were obtained between January 2003 and June 2004 from the European Space Agency’s 
Envisat satellite, which scans the globe every six days. 
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Figure2: Chinese Cities’ Nitrogen Dioxide concentrations4 Oct. 2004. Source: Envisat 
 
Coal mining in particular as it is practiced in China is an environment-degrading process.  
In order to minimize degradation of water, soil, air, and human health, it is extremely 
important to formulate strict rules, regulations, acts, and laws keeping local socio-
economic, geologic, environmental settings in mind.  The usual principles documents 
such as  the Equatorial Principles and World Bank Standards  are written in generalized 
terms and are not enforceable or applicable to a particular country.  The Equatorial 
Principles are suggested by lenders to borrowing companies as recommended sets of 
rules which encourage an environmental assessment and corporate social responsibility 
before a lender can loan out a huge sum of money.  These principles also emphasize the 
need for participation by local stakeholders in projects carried out by private companies 
that borrow money from a financial institution like ADB.  What China needs is to 
formulate a strong legal framework similar to or, given the fragility of her environment 
and dense population, even stronger than those in India or the USA in order to control 
environmental degradation, monitor compliance, and enforce rules and laws applicable 
during all phases of coal mining.   
 
Some Distributional Issues: 
 
By any measure—even discounting by a few percentage points to satisfy the skeptics--- 
China’s economic growth over the last two decades has been impressive.5 However 
                                                 
4
 Nitrogen dioxide maps like that shown here have been produced using nadir-sounding data: while NO2 
concentrations vary widely across the troposphere they are evenly spread across the upper atmosphere, the 
stratosphere. So nitrogen dioxide levels measured above the remotest parts of the Pacific were used to 
determine a general column for stratospheric nitrogen dioxide, which could be subtracted from the global 
data to determine tropospheric vertical column values. Although NO2 is formed naturally by lightning and 
by microbes in the ground, it is also released into the atmosphere from the burning of fossil fuels by power 
plants, heavy industry and vehicles. Large quantities of the gas can cause respiratory problems and lung 
damage, and can also contribute to harmful ozone forming near ground level. 
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particularly since 1995 the distributional situation has deteriorated . This has happened 
both spatially and in almost a fractal way within provinces and nationally. The Gini index 
and other measures of inequality all bear this out. 
   
Although rapid growth has led to a large reduction in absolute poverty, there are 
questions as to how much more mere growth-induced poverty reduction can succeed in 
the future. According to some observers, China has large pockets of chronic poverty that 
will be hard to tackle by high growth alone. The model of appendix 1 which is a short to 
intermediate run model, yields groth-poverty elasticities in the range of .6 to .85. 
Furthermore, according to my preliminary calculations using this model, the severity of 
poverty can not be diminished by growth alone. In fact, in some instances, for exmple 
among the rural poor households in Gansu province, growth actually worsens poverty 
severity. This is not an argument against growth; but it does point to using a more 
distributionally sensitive and inclusive approach to growth and redistribution. In 
particular, increasing both physical assets including land and the social capabilities of the 
poor will be crucial if the current administrations declared goal of a harmonious society is 
to be achieved.  
 
 
 
 For China’s policy makers all the above issues pose serious strategic questions. What 
options are available to them? What can be realistically done over the short and medium 
terms ? Fortunately, a distributionally sensitive strategy which is ecologically sustainable 
is available. 
 In the next section, I review and assess the steps taken and suggest in broad outlines a 
strategy most likely to succeed. If there is serious interest, the sectoral and regional 
details can be worked out within the course of a few months by an international team of 
competent researchers with heavy Chinese participation and policy inputs to Chinese 
policymakers from such a group of experts  can then lead to rapid implementation of 
energy, infrastructure and other sectoral policies along with poverty reduction and  
capabilities enhancement policies. 
 
 
3. China’s energy dilemma: strategic moves 
 
 
China’s energy dilemma has renewed concerns about long term  energy security. Several 
decades ago, the same concerns existed but the solution was also clear and simple--- to 
increase domestic production. Our analysis indicates that this is no longer a viable 
option.6 Discovery of large reserves is unlikely. Thus oil is seen as a source of 
vulnerability in Beijing. Since plans for building a POLIS depend crucially on oil, it 
                                                                                                                                                 
5
 The quality of Chinese statistics has been questioned. However, even critics such as Rawski accept that 
the long-term trend growth rate is impressive. See Thomas G. Rawski, ‘Measuring China’s recent GDP 
growth: where do we stand?’ www.pitt.edu/ tgrawski,  Aug.2002.  
6
 See also Christoffersen (1998) for an analysis of the situation particularly with respect to China’s relations 
with Russia and Central Asia in historical perspective. 
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could make China  vulnerable to foreign pressures. Many years of debate within the state 
council has not resolved this difficult problem. Policy makers have been divided over 
whether domestic production should be increased or explore for oil abroad. In practice 
both the paths are being followed. I will argue that neither is going to reduce vulnerability 
to a large extent soon. In the medium to long run, however, there is a third option 
available; but it will require both rethinking development priorities at home and 
reorienting diplomacy towards greater regional cooperation. But let us look at the 
existing divided strategy first. 
 
The centerpiece of the current strategy seems to be an ambitious scheme of investment in 
overseas oil projects together with continuing domestic exploration. The state owned oil 
companies of China are the key players in both arenas. During the 1980s China launched 
three large oil companies. The China National Offshore Oil Corporation(CNOOC) has 
controlled most of the offshore oil businesses since its founding in 1982. The China 
National Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) was founded in 1983 and is responsible 
for refining and marketing. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was 
founded in 1988 by the ministry of petroleum industry. In 1998 the government 
reorganized CNPC and Sinopec and created two vertically integrated oil companies. 
However,  CNPC is still China’s dominant upstream oil company and Sinopec the main 
downstream company in the industry. 
 
Initially, the government maintained a two-tiered pricing policy that required CNPC to 
sell to its industrial customers at a fraction of the market price. The resulting cash flow 
constraint led to limited exploration. From the users’ perspective, artificially low price of 
oil led to inefficient energy use for industrial production and transportation in particular. 
In 1993, the government relaxed the pricing policy increasing the first tier crude price. 
CNPC was the main beneficiary, as indeed was the intention. CNPC officials knew that 
unless the money was quickly invested it would be confiscated. The coincidental 
appointment of Zhou Yongkang who favored Chinese investment abroad led to rapid 
overseas expansion of investment.7 Since this time, views of top CNPC officials have 
mattered a great deal in China’s foreign energy investments. However, they are chosen 
ultimately by the Communist Party leadership. Hence it can be rightly said that the Party 
is the final arbiter. 
 
 
The importance accorded  to foreign investment in the energy sector is shown by the fact 
that  CNPC has invested in energy from Canada to Kazakhstan. In 1997 it pledged over 
$8 billion for oil concessions in Canada, Venezuela, Iraq and the Sudan. Such activities 
underline the high priority attached to these projects. They can also lead to increasing 
tension between China and the US. For example, in 1997, CNPC acquired a sixty per cent 
stake in Kazakhstan’s Aktyubinskmunaigaz Production Association. CNPC beat out 
Texaco, Amoco and Russia’s Yujnimost by agreeing to pay $320 million bonus to the 
Kazakh government and to conduct a feasibility study on the construction of an 1800 
                                                 
7
 For a detailed description see, Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg . 1998. Policy Making in China: 
Leaders, Structures, and Processes , Princeton: , Princeton University Press. 
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mile pipeline to Western China. This was estimated to cost $ 3.5 billion.In September 
1997, CNPC followed similar tactics to defeat Petronas, Unocal and Amoco to win a 
controlling interest in Uzen, Kazakhstan’s second largest oilfield with reserves of 1.5 bb.  
 
In June 1997, a consortium of Chinese oil companies signed a 22-year production sharing 
contract with Iraq to develop half of the Al-Ahdab field after thhe lifting of UN sanctions. 
Al-Ahdab is the country’s second largest oilfield. Prior to the US invasion of Iraq, CNPC 
was negotiating for rights to develop three other Iraqi fields. These are Halfaya, Luhais 
and Suba. 
 
However, the US invasion of Iraq and the subsequent occupation has put these plans in 
great jeopardy. The global energy situation is now marked by even more uncertainty and 
the Chinese must feel more vulnerable than ever. It is always possible that US 
imperialism will fail like all imperialist powers to ultimately control the middle eastern 
oil or even the sea routes permanently. But the realists in China must know that the 
current situation is one of US dominance. Apart from its domestic snafus reflected in the 
facts such as that Kazakhstan-China pipeline plans were shelved in 1999, the US 
preeminence as a military power and its willingness to use this power for various 
purposes including protecting control over overseas oil, China’s energy dependence 
seems logically to lead to dependence on the US hegemony. What is the way out? I 
suggest that rethinking development strategy and increasing regional cooperation offer 
the best hope for China. 
 
Strategically, Chinese development path has been so far marked by the East Asian 
model.According to this model heavy state involvement together with the promotion of 
market led industrialization through export promotion is the best strategy for 
development. As an industrialization strategy, this can succeed up to a point. However, as 
the Asian financial crisis demonstrated, there are risks as well (Khan1997, 1998, 2004 a 
and b).The Chinese strategy has led to high growth and a lopsided distribution together 
with energy dependence. Following this path further without qualification, as the current 
leadership seems to have grasped, will exacerbate the negative aspects with the inevitable 
growth  slowdown. However, there is an alternative which I have developed in detail 
elsewhere. Here I will merely sketch the main outline. 
 
In my development of an alternative strategy(Khan 1983, 1982a and b, 1997,1998, 2002, 
2003, 2004 a and b; Khan and Sonko 1994) based among others on an extension of  
Schumpeterian theory of innovation and Sen’s capabilities, the key is a distributionally 
sensitive approach with clear recognition of ecological constraints.The main idea is to 
moderate the growth rate and hence short term dependence on fossil fuels and minimize 
consequent ecological problems.With a proper poverty reduction strategy---called 
‘growth plus’strategy8--- the adverse distributional consequences from moderate growth 
can be avoided. In fact, with a properly moderate ‘growth plus’strategy, the capabilities 
of the great majority of the poulation caan be enhanced along with the productive 
capacity. This will lead to the creation of a domestic market for commodities that are 
produced in a much more ecologically sustainable manner. Furthermore, the goal of a 
                                                 
8
 This is discussed in detail in chapter 1 of Khan and Weiss (2007). 
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transition to a relatively non-fossil fuel based knowledge and information economy will 
be facilitated and the transition will occur more quickly and smoothly under the proposed 
POLIS strategy. Although the move away from fossil fuels can only be gradual, a 
beginning must be made not in a makeshift way, nor for the purpose of window dressing 
but in a genuinely strategic manner at the highest policy making level. 
 
Therefore, serious attention must be paid to the scope and necessity for developing and 
harnessing alternative energy sources, including renewable ones. Starting from the 
realistic assessment that in the short and medium run fossil fuels will be still the 
predominant  ingredients in China’s energy mix, serious and credible plans will need to 
be formulated for increasing the share of alternative energy sources .  For example, China 
has rich potential for solar, wind, and tidal energy. China may also consider the potential 
of modern bio-fuels. Given the importance of agriculture in the economy even with rapid 
growth and industrialization, it may be possible to find a win-win solution by choosing an 
appropriate crop mix that also enhances the country’s energy security. Bio-gas energy 
can also play an important part in this mix. In addition, there is a pressing need for 
reducing system loss, and improving energy efficiency in buildings and transportation 
sectors. The Chinese government should also be cognizant that coal is a fossil fuel and 
coal-fired power plants are one of the primary sources of global warming. China’s future 
energy choices must be mindful of the impacts of climate change for the sake of the 
future generations in China and the world. A strategic step consistent with the POLIS 
strategy suggested here that will signal credibility is for the Chinese government  to 
initiate a public consultation process for formulation of a national energy strategy, so that 
all the relevant issues  can be discussed and resolved in an open, participatory, and 
transparent manner. Creation of a domestic market system in a harmonious society  
which is the goal of the current regime will in fact require such a move. 
 
 
The question of domestic market creation leads also to considerations of cooperation in 
Asia. For reasons of regional financial stability, reciprocal exporting and  energy security 
greater cooperation in each of these spheres is an urgent necessity. China along with the 
other countries in Northeast Asia must proceed to diffuse tensions and build up regional 
institutions. Given the historic hostilities this will be no easy task. Yet the enlightened 
self-interests of the countries together with imperatives of regional peace and prosperity 
lead logically towards cooperation. There is much here to learn from European 
integration experience, particularly about the role of enlightened leadership. No doubt, 
there are special Asian features and special Asian roadblocks that might require particular 
Asian approaches to negotiation and conflict resolution at times. But China’s energy 
dilemma is one compelling reason for that country to take the initiative and start a 
dialogue. There is no time to lose. In particular the dialogue with Japan is of great 
significance. I now turn to a brief analysis of the problems of  and  prospects for 
cooperation between China and Japan in the near future. 
 
 
4. China-Japan Energy Relations: Conflict and Cooperation 
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The current relation between China and Japan in the energy security area continues a 
historic dialogue which has at times been difficult. The most recent moves, on the surface 
at least, seem to signal increased willingness to cooperate on the part of both the 
countries in some crucial areas of mutual concern. 
On April 11, 2007, the Japan-China Joint Press Statement was announced in Tokyo, 
Japan, during the time Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited Japan. In the 
statement, the content related to the energy sector in particular is as follows:  
 
(2) Reinforcement of mutually beneficial cooperation  
(i) Energy and environmental cooperation 
 
Both sides welcomed the announcement of the "Joint Statement by Japan and the 
People's Republic of China on the Further Enhancement of Cooperation for 
Environmental Protection". Both sides affirmed their sincere efforts at tackling the global 
environmental issues affecting the two countries. Furthermore, both sides confirmed that 
they would focus their cooperation on areas such as prevention of water pollution in vital 
waters including the Bo Hai and Huang Hai regions and the Yangtze basin, building 
recycling societies, air pollution prevention, measures to combat climate change, 
prevention of drifting marine litter, and measures for tackling acid rain and yellow sand. 
 
Both sides welcomed the holding of the First Energy Ministerial Policy Dialogue and the 
announcement of a joint statement concerning energy cooperation enhancement. Both 
sides agreed that they would strengthen their cooperation focusing on energy-realted 
issues such as energy conservation, coal and nuclear power etc. Such cooperation will 
also include model projects for the promotion of energy conservation and environmental 
businesses. Furthermore, attempts will be made to bolster cooperation within multilateral 
frameworks for the promotion of energy conservation in the Asian region. 
 
Both sides supported the activities of the Japan-China Board of Assistance to Greening 
Activities. They confirmed that they would further promote reforestation cooperation 
programs carried out in China by Japanese private entities, and that the two countries 
would cooperate toward sustainable forest management. 
       Starting in the 1980s, contrary to belligerent political rhetoric at times, China and 
Japan has cooperated economically in a number of areas. However, there were and still 
are many potential areas of conflict. It may be recalled that China has received a great 
deal of Japanese aid in the past.The section below gives a brief overview of this relation 
which may have paved the way for cooperation in the areas of energy and environment. 
 
 
 
Overview of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China 
 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China began in 1979 and from that time to 
the present, approximately 3.1331 trillion yen in loan aid (yen loans), 145.7 billion yen in 
grant aid, and 144.6 billion yen in technical cooperation have been implemented. Grant 
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aid is financial assistance that is extended to recipient countries without imposing an 
obligation of repayment. Loan aid involves the provision of loans under relaxed 
conditions (low interest, long repayment period) to recipient countries. These are in 
principle untied loans. Technical cooperation involves the technologies being provided to 
recipient countries to spread the use of technology among people in developing countries 
and improve technical levels. 
 
Past ODA projects in China included large-scale economic infrastructure projects, 
including the building of roads, airports and power stations, as well as infrastructure 
projects in medical and environmental areas. These projects have played a significant role 
in the realization of China's current economic growth. 
 
For example, through Japanese loan aid (yen loans), a total length of 5,200 km of railway 
lines were electrified, and in the area of seaports, approximately 60 large-size berths 
capable of taking ships in excess of 10,000 tons were built. In addition, the China-Japan 
Friendship Hospital that was established through grant aid is one of the major medical 
institutions in the Beijing metropolitan area, treating approximately 3,000 patients each 
day.  
 
Assistance includes more than infrastructure projects. In the area of technical cooperation 
the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has accepted trainees from China for 
the purpose of providing assistance to cultivate administrative personnel. As of FY2003 
JICA had accepted a cumulative total of over 15,000 trainees, and the Association for 
Overseas Technical Scholarship (AOTS) had accepted more than 22,000 trainees to 
nurture the human resources required for industrial promotion. JICA has also dispatched 
5,000 experts to China. 
 
Large-scale Economic Infrastructure Projects (Loan Aid) 
Airports 
Shanghai Pudong International Airport Construction Project (40.0 billion yen)  
Beijing Capital Airport Terminal Area Expansion Project (30.0 billion yen)  
Lanzhou Zhongchuan Airport Expansion Project (6.3 billion yen)  
Wuhan Tianhe Aerodrome Construction Project (6.3 billion yen)  
Xi'an Xianyang International Airport Terminal Expansion Project (3.09 billion yen)  
Cumulative total of aid in this area excluding the above-mentioned projects: 111.6 billion 
yen 
 
Railway Lines 
Beijing-Qinhuangdao Railway Expansion Project (87.0 billion yen)  
Guiyang-Loudi Railway Construction Project (30.0 billion yen)  
Chongqing Urban Railway Construction Project (27.1 billion yen)  
Beijing Subway Construction Project (19.7 billion yen)  
Datong-Qinhuangdao Railway Construction Project (18.4 billion yen)  
Cumulative total of aid in this area excluding the above-mentioned projects: 641.8 billion 
yen 
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Roads 
Hangzhou-Quzhou Expressway Construction Project (30.0 billion yen)  
Liangping-Changshou Highway Construction Project (24.0 billion yen)  
Xinxiang-Zhengzhou Highway Construction Project (23.5 billion yen)  
Guiyang-Xinzhai Highway Construction Project (15.0 billion yen)  
Heilongjiang Heihe-Beian Road Construction Project (12.6 billion yen)  
Cumulative total of aid in this area excluding the above-mentioned projects: 195.1 billion 
yen 
 
Seaports 
Qinhuangdao Port Expansion Project (67.4 billion yen)  
Qingdao Port Expansion Project (59.7 billion yen)  
Huanghua Port Construction Project (15.4 billion yen)  
Shenzhen Dapeng Bay Yantian Port 1st Phase Construction Project (14.7 billion yen)  
Dalian Port Dayao Bay 1st Phase Construction Project (6.7 billion yen)  
Cumulative total of aid in this area excluding the above-mentioned projects: 272.6 billion 
yen 
 
Power Stations 
Tianshengqiao Hydroelectric Power Project (118.0 billion yen)  
Jiangxi Jiujiang Thermal Power Plant Construction Project (29.6 billion yen)  
Wuqiangxi Dam Construction Project (25.2 billion yen)  
Shanhe Thermal Power Plant Construction Project (24.6 billion yen)  
Beijing Shisanling Pumped Storage Power Station Construction Project (13.0 billion yen)  
Cumulative total of aid in this area excluding the above-mentioned projects: 488.2 billion 
yen 
 
Fertilizer Plants 
Weihe Chemical Fertilizer Plant Construction Project (26.9 billion yen)  
Inner Mongolia Chemical Fertilizer Construction Project (21.4 billion yen)  
Jiujiang Chemical Fertilizer Plant Construction Project (21.4 billion yen)  
Cumulative total of aid in this area excluding the above-mentioned projects: 106.3 billion 
yen 
 
Steel Plants 
Shanghai Baoshan Infrastructure Improvement Project (31.0 billion yen)  
Environment Protection 
Prevention of Air Pollution 
Environment Model City Project (Guiyang, Chongqing, Dalian) (30.7 billion yen)  
Forestation 
Ningxia Afforestation and Vegetation Cover Project (8.0 billion yen)  
Sewage System 
Xiang River Basin Hunan Environment Improvement Project (3.1 billion yen)  
Beijing Sewage Treatment Plant Construction Project (2.6 billion yen)  
Cumulative total of aid in this area excluding the above-mentioned projects: 857.8 billion 
yen 
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Human Resources Development Projects 
Inland Higher Education Project (88.8 billion yen)  
Infrastructure Projects in Medical and Environmental Areas 
The Project for Construction of the China-Japan Friendship Hospital (Grant aid: 16.430 
billion yen)  
The Project for Construction of the China-Japan Friendship Environment Protection 
Center (Grant aid: 10.499 billion yen / Technical cooperation: 1.997 billion yen) 
 
 
Energy Loans 
The State Department of China authorized the Bank of China as the delegate to negotiate 
with the Japan Import and Export Bank. In 1979 May, the two sides signed a memo for 
energy loan, the amounts of which reached 420 billion Yen. And in 1984 and 1992, Japan 
Import and Export Bank provided two other energy loans to Bank of China, which 
reached 580 billion and 700 billion Yen respectively. Thus, the total amount of energy 
loan Japan provided to China is 1.7 trillion Yen. 
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Dateline of China-Japan Energy Issues 
East China Sea Dispute between China and Japan 
Reason: unclear borderline definition in East China Sea. 
1969 Four corporations including TEIKOKU OIL in Japan applied for the oil gas development right to Japanese government 
1970 China started to explore oil and gas resources in East China Sea. 
1982 Japan proposed the principle of "midline" to China, for division of the 
water area of East China Sea between the two countries. 
2004 May China started to develop the Chunxiao Gasfield in East China Sea. 
2004 June China proposed that the two countries should cooperatively develop the 
resources in this area. 
2004 June 
Japanese government set up the "sea right related cabinet minister 
conference", encouraging Japanese enterprises explore resources in 
East China Sea. 
2004 July 
Japan began to conduct seabed resource surveys to the east of their 
unilateral "midline" in the East China Sea, an area disputed between the 
two countries. 
2004 Oct Japan and China held the first round of talk on the East China Sea issue. 
2005 Apr Japanese government started to accept enterprises' application for East China Sea resource development and exploration. 
2005 May Japan and China held the second round of talk on the East China Sea issue. 
2005 July Japanese government granted the TEIKOKU OIL the right to explore gas in East China Sea. 
2005 Aug TEIKOKU OIL completed all the government-required procedures. 
2005 Sep 
Japan and China held the third round of talk on the East China Sea 
issue. Japan accepted China's proposal of cooperative development in 
this area. 
2006 Mar Japan and China held the fourth round of talk on the East China Sea issue. 
2006 May 
Japan and China held the fifth round of talk on the East China Sea 
issue. The two sides reached an initial intent of cooperative 
development 
2006 July Japan and China held the sixth round of talk on the East China Sea issue. 
2007 Mar Japan and China held the seventh round of talk on the East China Sea issue. 
2007 Apr 
The Prime Minister of China visited Japan, during which he had talk 
with the Prime Minister of Japan about East China Sea dispute. They 
agreed the acceleration of the future talks on this dispute. And a basic 
time table for the dispute resolution has been reached. 
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Dateline of China-Japan Energy Issues 
 
1972   
Nov. 
27 
Japan-China Association on Economy & Trade was founded in Tokyo. 
1974   
Jan The Foreign Minister of Japan – Masayoshi Ohira – visited China, during which the 
two countries signed the China-Japan Trade Agreement in Beijing. 
1978   
Feb Signing of the China-Japan Non-governmental Long-term Trade Resolution in 
Beijing. 
Aug  The Foreign Minister of Japan – Tadashi Sonoda – visted China. Signing of the 
Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty in Beijing. 
1980   
May 
28 
Scientific Cooperative Agreement between People’s Republic of China and Japan 
was signed and became effective in Tokyo. 
May 
29 
Agreements between China and Japan on cooperative oil exploitation in South and 
West Bohai Bay was signed in Tokyo. 
Dec 
15 
Bohai Oil Corporation and Chengbei Oil Development Corporation (CODC) of 
Japan signed the Chengbei Oilfield Development Contract. The total investment 
capital reached 270 million US dollars. It put into operation in 1986, and it is the 
first Chinese-Japanese joint venture in this regard. 
1981   
Jun 
23-
24 
China-Japan Scientific Cooperation Committee held the first meeting in Beijing. 
Dec 
15-
16 
The second China-Japan government member meeting was held in Tokyo. During 
the meeting, the two parties signed a summary about the capital cooperation of 
Daqing oil chemical industry and Baogang Steel 1st stage construction. 
1982   
Feb 
18 
China and Japan signed an agreement for cooperation on the coal exploration in 
Liuzhuang coal mine zone, in Anhui Province of China. It is the first project that 
Chinese geological industry cooperated with a foreign country. 
1983   
Sep 
5 
Petroleum companies from China, Japan, UK and US signed a contract stating they 
will cooperatively explore the oil in the South China Sea. The contract was signed in 
Beijing. 
1984   
Dec 
17 
China and Japan signed an agreement on atomic energy between Chinese 
government and Japanese government. 
1989   
Mar  
 
Japanese Export and Import bank provided a loan of about 72.6 billion Yen to Bank 
of China. And this loan was supposed to be used in the exploration of China’s land 
oil fields such as Liaohe oil field in Northern China. 
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  Bozhong 28-1 oilfield jointly developed by China and Japan was put into operation 
1990 Bozhong 34-2/4E oilfield jointly developed by China and Japan was put into 
operation 
1993   
May 
18 
China-Japan Energy Communication Association is founded in Beijing. 
1994   
Feb According to Chinese custom's statistics of 1993, Japan had become the largest trade 
partner of China. 
May 
3 
China-Japan Nuclear Safety Agreement was signed in Beijing 
1995   
Aug 
29 
Because of China's nuclear experiment, Japan announced the suspension of interest 
free loans and aid provided to China. 
1996   
  Diaoyu Island dispute became the hot point in China-Japan relationship. 
  July 17th, Japan claimed that Diaoyu Island belonged to Japan. 
  The two countries' debate kind of restrained the economic cooperations between the 
two countries. 
    
2006 Joint Statement of Energy Ministers of China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea and 
the United States was announced in Beijing, China 
2007   
Apr 
11-
13 
Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited Japan 
Apr 
11 
the Japan-China Joint Press Statement was announced in Tokyo, Japan. In this 
statement, the two countries reinforced their agreement on energy cooperation in the 
future. 
Apr 
12 
The first minister-level energy policy dialogue between China and Japan was held in 
Tokyo. The two sides singed an agreement in which the two nations committed to 
cooperate on developing energy resources and building nuclear power plants in 
China. Both parties agreed that the energy dialogue will be held once a year and is 
expected to address energy conservation and other issues. They also decided to hold 
a "China-Japan energy-saving and environment protection symposium" in Beijing 
this September. 
  And the China-Japan energy cooperation symposium was held. About 180 
companies and research institutions, totally more than 600 entrepreneurs, of two 
countries attended the symposium. They are divided into 4 groups: electricity, oil 
and gas, coal, and new energy, for discussion. And 6 cooperation accords and/or 
agreements also were signed in various areas including electricity and gas. 
  China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Nippon Oil Corporation of 
Japan agreed on the cooperation in the area of overseas oil and gas development. 
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Nippon agreed to provide oil refining techniques and oil chemical techniques to 
China, and it agreed to promote more technique cooperation on new energy 
development such as biofuel. At the same time, both sides agreed to cooperate more 
in energy safety and environment protection. 
  China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and Mitsui & Co. Ltd of Japan 
also signed an accord on liquefied natural gas (LNG) spot trading on the same day. 
  China Datang Corporation (CDT), one of the five large-scaled power generation 
enterprises in China, and Kyushu Electric Power and Sumitomo Corporation of 
Japan signed a framework agreement about cooperation in the area of renewable 
energy. The three companies will construct a wind farm in Neimenggu Province of 
China. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.Conclusions and Future Directions 
 
 
 
In this paper I have sketched the energy dilemma for China in this century. As long as the 
current geopolitical situation persists the pursuit of present development strategy of 
China will further increase its energy dependence. For both political and economic 
reasons China needs to rethink its development strategy. I have sketched such an 
alternative strategy that relies much less on fossil fuels and emphasizes regional 
cooperation. This POLIS strategy will ultimately lead to a sustainable economy based on 
growth with equity. A transition to a non- fossil fuel based knowledge and information 
economy will also be easier to effect under the proposed strategy.  
 
 
However, time is of the essence. Given the path dependence of development unless 
strategic disengagement from the existing path followed by a strategic engagement with 
the alternative strategy is begun within the next five years, it may well be too late. The 
stakes are indeed very high. A  more detailed strategy paper based on the key ideas from 
the alternative strategy outlined here with concrete quantitative scenarios and feasibility 
studies along the lines of models sketched in the appendix ( and other, more detailed 
models) will go some distance towards  giving the appropriate analytical foundations for 
the policy makers. The preliminary results confirm the predictions regarding fossil fuel-
based energy shortage and lead towards a serious consideration of alternative energy 
sources. Achieving the twin goals of energy security and ecological balance are 
challenging but not impossible for China. Serious policy research can be used effectively 
if there is the political will to do so. The goal of regional cooperation is also achievable if 
patient negotiations in good faith can start in earnest.In particular, cooperation with other  
Asian economies, particularly Japan, Indonesia, Viet Nam and India will be crucial.This 
paper has sketched out the complexities of cooperation and conflict between China and 
Japan. Future work will address the problems of Regional cooperation for China in the 
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East, South and South Asian context as well as in the context of Africa and Latin 
America.
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Appendix 1: Growth Impacts of the energy sectors--- A simple SAM-based Model 
 
Fixed Price Modeling in a SAM-based Framework: 
 In this section the Social Accounting Matrix is presented as a data gathering 
framework as well as an analytical tool for studying the effects the energy sectors on 
growth. Appendix two presents the methodology for estimating the impact of growth 
generated by the energy sectors on poverty alleviation.  The origins of social accounting 
can be traced as far back as Gregory King’s efforts in 1681, but more recent work stems 
from the attempts by Richard Stone, Graham Pyatt, Erik Thorkbecke and others. 9 
In the methodological framework of this study the SAM is used for mapping 
production and distribution at the economy wide level.  In this section, first a general 
SAM is described.  Then it is shown how the method for studying the effect of growth 
within this framework follows logically from its structure.  The model used is a simple 
version of a class of SAM-based general equilibrium models.10  It summarizes succinctly 
the interdependence between productive activities, factor shares, household income 
distribution, balance of payments, capital accounts, etc. for the economy as a whole at a 
point in time.  Given the technical conditions of production the value added is distributed 
to the factors in a determinate fashion.  The value added accrued by the factors is further 
received by households according to their ownership of assets and the prevailing wage 
structure.  In the matrix form the SAM consists of rows and columns representing 
receipts and expenditures, respectively.  As an accounting constraint receipts must equal 
expenditures. 
 As is elaborated further in Khan and Thorbecke (1988), the SAM framework can 
be used to depict a set of linear relationships in a fixed coefficient model.  For deciding 
the question of determination, the accounts need to be divided into exogenous and 
endogenous ones.  For instance, in the China SAM, there are three endogenous accounts.  
These are factors, households and production activities, leaving the government, capital 
and the rest of the world accounts as exogenous.11 
                                                 
9
 For a description of SAM as a data gathering device, see G. Pyatt and E. Thorbecke, Planning Techniques 
for a Better Future (Geneva:  ILO, 1976). Khan(1997) also has a chapter on this alone. 
10In Walrasian general equilibrium models the flexible price vector determines the equilibrium.  In a 
Keynesian (dis)equilibrium model in the short-run the quantities vary while the price vector remains fixed. 
11
 See Khan and Thorbecke, op.cit., Ch. II for more theoretical details and empirical examples.  The 
presentations here follow the cited work closely.   
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Table 1: Simplified Schematic Social Accounting Matrix  
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 Looking at Table 2, which represents a SAM, we can see immediately that 
y = n + x   (1) 
y = 1 + t   (2) 
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Now if we divide the entries in the matrix Tnn by the corresponding total income (i.e. yn), 
we can define a corresponding matrix of average expenditure propensities.  Let us call 
this matrix A.  We now have: 
y = n + x = Ay + x  (3) 
y = (1-A)-1x = Mx  (4) 
M has been called the matrix of accounting multipliers by Thorbecke, for these 
multipliers, when computed, can account for the results (e.g. income, consumption, etc.) 
obtained in the SAM without explaining the process that led to them.  Let us now 
partition the matrix A in the following way.12 
                                                 
12
 Ibid. 
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 ⎡0  0  A13  ⎤ 
 ⎜           ⎥ 
A= ⎜A21  A22  0     ⎥  (5) 
 ⎜            ⎥ 
 ⎣0  A32  A33  ⎦ 
 
Table 2: Schematic Representation of Endogenous and Exogenous Accounts in a SAM  
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Source: H.A. Khan and E. Thornbecke, Choice and Diffusion of Technology in a 
Macroeconomic (SAM)   Framework 
 
 
Given the accounts factors, household and the production activities, now we see that the 
income levels of these accounts (call them y1, y2, y3 respectively) are determined as 
functions of the exogenous demand of all other accounts.  In this respect, what we have is 
a reduced-form model which can be consistent with a number of structural forms.  This is 
quite satisfactory as far as tracing the effects of a certain injection in the economy is 
concerned or for prediction purposes when the structural coefficients are more or less 
unchanged. 
 One limitation of the accounting multiplier matrix M as derived in equation (2.2) 
is that it implies unitary expenditure elasticities (the prevailing average expenditure 
propensities in A are assumed to apply to any incremental injection).  A more realistic 
alternative is to specify a matrix of marginal expenditure propensities (Cn below) 
corresponding to the observed income and expenditure elasticities of the different agents, 
under the assumption that prices remain fixed.  The Cn matrix can be partitioned in the 
same way as the A matrix above.  The most important difference between the two 
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partitioned  matrix is that C32 ≠ A32.  Expressing the changes in income (dy) resulting 
from changes in injections (dx), one obtains,  
dyn = Cndyn + dx  (6) 
      = (I - Cn)-1 dx = Mcdx (7) 
Mc has been called a fixed price multiplier matrix and its advantage is that it allows any 
nonnegative income and expenditure elasticities to be reflected in Mc.  In particular, in 
exploring the macroeconomic effects of exogenous changes in the output of different 
product-cum-technologies on other macroeconomic variables, it would be very unrealistic 
to assume that consumers react to any given proportional change in their incomes by 
increasing expenditures on the different commodities by exactly that same proportion 
(i.e. assuming that the income elasticities of demand of the various socioeconomic 
household groups for the various commodities were all unity).  Since the expenditure 
(income) elasticity is equal to the ratio of the marginal expenditure propensity (MEPi) to 
the average expenditure propensity (AEPi) for any given good i, it follows that the 
marginal expenditure propensity can be readily obtained once the expenditure elasticity 
and the average expenditure propensities are known, i.e.,  
yi = MEPi/AEPi   (8) 
MEPi = yi AEPi  (9) 
and ΣMEPi = 1  (10) 
       i 
 
Thus, given the matrix A32 of average expenditure propensities, and the corresponding 
expenditure elasticities of demand, yi the corresponding marginal expenditure 
propensities matrix C32 could easily be derived.13 
 
. 
                                                 
13See Khan and Thorbecke (1988) for some examples.  
See also G. Pyatt and J.I. Round, “Accounting and Fixed Price Multipliers in Social Acounting Matrix 
Framework,” Economic Journal Vol. 89, Dec. 1979, p. 861. 
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Appendix 2: Energy Sectors, Growth, Distribution and Poverty. 
Multiplier Decomposition,Growth and Poverty Alleviation Sensitivity 
 Since poverty in the present context is measured by identifying a poverty line in 
monetary terms incomes of the various household groups are the crucial variables.  In 
particular, sectoral growth generated by the energy sectors must be linked to incomes of 
the various households in order to determine the exact extent of the alleviation of poverty 
through growth.  The exact effect of income growth on poverty, of course, depends on the 
sensitivity of the adopted poverty measure to income.  In this paper the Foster, Greer and 
Thorbecke (1984) Pα class of additively decomposable poverty measure is selected for 
this purpose.  For α=0,1,n this measure becomes the headcount ratio, the poverty gap and 
a distributionally sensitive measure that gives specific weights to each poor person’s 
shortfall, respectively.   
 If we apply Kakwani’s (1993) decomposition to the Pα measure for specific  
sectors and households i and j respectively, the change in Pαij can be written as follows: 
                  
    dPαij  =   ∂Pαij  +     Σ  ∂Pαij   d θijk    (11) 
        
∂yi            k=1      ∂θijk                       
 
Here Pαij is the FGT Pα measure connecting sector j to household group i, yi is the mean 
per-capita income of household group i,  and θ ijk is the income distribution parameter.  
Under the unrealistic but simplifying assumption of distributional neutrality: 
d Pαij = ηαi⎛dyi⎞ (12) 
     
Pαij              ⎝yi ⎠  
 
where ηαi  is the elasticity of Pij with respect to the mean per capita income of each 
household group i resulting from an increase in the output of sector j.  dyi on the right 
hand side is the change in mean per capita income of household group i.  This can be 
written as (by considering the fixed price multiplier matrix) 
 dyc = mij dxj  (13) 
 where dxj is the change in the output of sector j on a per capita basis for group j. 
We can now rewrite the aηverage change in poverty measure as 
 d Pαij= ηαimij  ⎛dxj⎞ (14) 
              Pαij               ⎝yi  ⎠ 
 
By aggregating across the household groups we can arrive at the overall poverty 
alleviation effect 
            
                        m                                         m 
d Pαj    Σ   ⎛dPαij⎞  ⎛ni⎞     Σ   ⎛dPαij⎞  ⎛Pαij⎞  (15) 
               Pαj = i=1   ⎝Pαij ⎠   ⎝n ⎠ =  i=1   ⎝Pαij   ⎠  ⎝Pαj ⎠ 
Since we are considering a Pα measure  
           m 
dPαj = Σ    ⎛dPαij ⎞ ⎛Σ(z-yk)/z)α ⎞  (16) 
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  Pαj       i=1     ⎝Pαij  ⎠  ⎝Σ(z-yl)/z)α ⎠ 
 
                                                                                                                          m 
where qi is the number of poor in the ith group and the total number of poor q=Σqi 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
i=1
 
                                                                                               m 
Let sαi be the poverty share of household group i (naturally Σ sαi = 1) 
                                                                                               
i=1
 
        qi                  q 
sαi = Σ⎛z-yk⎞α  Σ   ⎛z-yl ⎞α  (17) 
           k=1⎝  z ⎠     l=1    ⎝ z   ⎠ 
 
We can further rewrite the expression for the average change in overall poverty 
alleviation. 
           m 
dPαj = Σ ⎛dPαji⎞ sαi  (18) 
 Pαj      i=1  ⎝Pαij  ⎠ 
Combining equations 14 and 18 
we now have, 
dPαj = Σsαiηαi mij ⎛dxj ⎞  (19) 
 Pαj                                 ⎝ yi   ⎠ 
 
 
 Thorbecke and Jung(1996) separate the income increase via the modified 
multiplier effect from the sensitivity of the poverty measure formally in equation (19) by 
defining the following two entities:   
1.  m/αij = sαimij gives the modified multiplier effect in terms of income of a poor group. 
2.  qαij = ηαi(dxj/yi) represents the sensitivity of the poverty index to the change in 
income.  I adopt their terminology and call this the poverty sensitivity effect. 
But each multiplier mij can be further decomposed: 
mij=ηjdij   (20) 
where nj gives the (closed loop) interdependency effects and dij the distributional effects 
of a change in demand for the product of sector j on household group i. 
Thus, 
                m 
dPαj/Pαj = Σm/αijqαij  (21) 
    m 
= Σ(rαij) (sαijdij)(qαij)  (22) 
    
i
 
The dij on the right hand side can be further decomposed by multiplicatively 
decomposing the total distributive effects. Given the structure of Cn matrix in section 2. 
D=D3D2D1 where D3= (I-C22)-1; D2=C21C13, and D1=(I-C33) -1 
The particular element for each household i and sector j can be selected from these three 
matrices.   
 Thus the contribution of an increase in output of a particular sector j to poverty 
alleviation can be decomposed multiplicatively into its two components:  (i) the 
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contribution due to the change in mean income of the poor across all groups and (ii) the 
sensitivity of the particular poverty measure to this change in average income of the poor. 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Joint Statement of Energy Ministers of 
China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea and the United States 
(Beijing, China on December 16, 2006) 
 
  
1. The energy ministers of China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea and the United States, 
which together account for nearly half of world oil consumption, met in Beijing, China 
on December 16, 2006 to discuss ways to promote energy security, stability, and 
sustainability. Energy is crucial to sustainable economic and social well-being in 
developed and developing countries. Our common challenge is to ensure sufficient, 
reliable and environmentally responsible supplies of energy with reasonable prices, as 
well as more efficient utilization of energy.  
                        
2. In recent years, fluctuations and increases in international oil prices have exerted a 
negative impact on the world economy, in particular for the developing countries. It is in 
this context that the energy ministers of the five countries held this meeting to review the 
world energy situation and the implications of increased oil prices on the global economy 
and to discuss cooperative efforts to advance: sufficient energy investment, energy 
conservation and efficiency, development of alternative energies and utilization of clean 
and efficient energy technologies, including those related to nuclear energy and clean 
coal and establishment of oil stockpiles. Our collective efforts are of great significance 
for the stability of the international oil and other energy markets and for enhancing global 
energy security.  
 
3. We recognize that the reasons behind the oil price volatility are complex and manifold, 
including growing demand for oil, concerns over the adequacy of investment in oil 
production capacity in the long-term, current low levels of spare production capacity, 
refining capacity bottlenecks, prolonged political instability in some oil producing 
regions and market speculation.  
 
4．We recognize that current high oil prices are affecting energy demand and 
investment. We affirm that market-based pricing helps send the appropriate signals for 
energy conservation and efficiency, and investment in conventional and alternative 
energies. We encourage investment based on market principles in oil and gas exploration 
and production so as to increase the supply capacity of oil and gas.  
 
5.     We recognize that China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea and the United States 
share common interests in the energy area. Our policies to accelerate the development 
and deployment of new energy technologies and improve energy efficiency will 
significantly enhance our energy security as well as global energy security. In order to 
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strengthen our collective energy security, we agree to enhance our cooperation in the 
following areas:  
 
i.Diversifying our energy mix to make wider use of clean and alternative energy, such as 
clean coal, nuclear energy and renewables, including in the transport sector. To this end, 
we will expand collaboration in research, development and deployment of alternative 
energy technologies such as clean coal, nuclear energy, renewables, hydrogen, bio-fuels, 
hybrid vehicle technologies and carbon sequestration,  
 
ii.Improving energy conservation and efficiency, which provides cost-effective solutions 
to enhancement of energy security, reduces green-house gas emissions and helps attain 
sustainable development  
 
iii.Strengthening cooperation on strategic oil stocks to promote international energy 
security. Past experience has shown that international coordination, such as through the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), in response to significant supply disruptions benefits 
world energy markets.  
 
iv.Improving transparency of data in the market through better sharing of information to 
enhance oil market stability.  In this context, we welcome implementation of the Joint Oil 
Data Initiative (JODI) and will continue to provide timely market data on oil. 
 
v.Encouraging extensive and in-depth cooperation among the business sectors of the five 
countries in areas including energy efficiency, alternative energies and transportation. In 
this context, we welcome the progress of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean 
Development and Climate (APP) and the collaborative efforts it has catalyzed between 
the business and public sectors in diffusing clean energy technologies and best practices 
in energy intensive sectors.  
 
6.We call on all countries of the international community to enhance global energy 
security through the following measures:  
 
i.Open, transparent, efficient and competitive energy markets to encourage investment in 
the whole energy supply chain, especially in oil and gas exploration and production, 
including transparent and effective legal and regulatory frameworks.  
 
ii.Diversification of energy supply and demand and energy sources.  
 
iii.Promotion of energy conservation and energy efficiency measures as well as 
development and deployment of environmentally sustainable energy technologies.  
 
iv.Cooperative energy emergency response through strategic oil stocks.  
 
v.Safeguarding critical energy infrastructure and sea route security for transportation of 
oil and gas.  
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vi.Improved quality and timeliness of energy data made available to the market.  
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